CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1330
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT DELEGATION OF FRANCE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GERARD ERRERA ON 29 JUNE IN THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

The Permanent Delegation of France to the Conference on Disarmament presents compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement made by the Permanent Representative of France, Mr. Gérard Errera, on 29 June 1995 in connection with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Permanent Delegation of France would be grateful if the secretariat would arrange to have this statement registered as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to all member and observer delegations to the Conference.

My delegation wishes to inform the Committee of the following three decisions:

(1) Firstly, regarding withdrawal clauses, some months ago we made a proposal whereby one of the events which might jeopardize supreme interests would be a fundamental change in the international circumstances which were the basis for the conclusion of a CTB.

The idea was to have the text of the treaty reflect one of the elements of the French position which we had explained at the start of negotiations, namely, that the permanent ending of tests was linked to an assessment of the international strategic situation, particularly the observance of commitments in the spheres of disarmament and of non-proliferation. I also explained to the Conference on Disarmament on 29 July 1993, and then to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 7 February 1994 what we meant by this: "We have particularly in mind the main instruments which determine [---] our assessment of the strategic situation, inter alia the ABM Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the START process [---] and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."

The debate which we had on withdrawal clauses at the last session revealed the continued existence of reservations on this proposal. Some delegations considered it superfluous, not to say problematic:

Superfluous in that the concept of supreme interest is sufficiently broad to cover a wide variety of situations;

Problematic in that it could restrict individual States' freedom sovereignly to assess the events jeopardizing their supreme interests.

Under the circumstances and in the interest of furthering the negotiations, France has decided not to press for the insertion of this wording. It considers its objectives - which still apply - to be covered by the general provision in the rolling text which reads "Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty [---] have jeopardized its supreme interests".

Without making it a condition for the withdrawal of its proposal, my delegation naturally urges the other delegations which have suggested additions to the withdrawal clause to support the traditional wording too so that it can be adopted by consensus.

(2) Secondly, it is clear that the nuclear Powers still retain a fundamental responsibility, that of ensuring the safety and reliability of their weapons.

We have stressed this crucial point since the start of negotiations.

I declare, therefore, that the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons represent for France a supreme interest.

(3) Finally, as to the duration of the future treaty, my delegation is in a position to state its formal agreement with the concept of a treaty of unlimited duration. The brackets around the word "unlimited" can therefore be removed.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1331
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JUNE 1995 FROM THE DEPUTY HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF SRI LANKA TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE HEAD OF DELEGATION AT THE 710th PLENARY MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON 29 JUNE 1995 CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY CERTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

I have the honour to refer to the intervention of my Ambassador concerning recent resumption of nuclear testing by certain nuclear weapon States, which was made during the 710th Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 29 June 1995

I should be grateful if you would kindly ensure that the attached part of this intervention could be produced as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) W.P.R.B. Wickremasinghe
Minister
Deputy Head of Delegation

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the continuation of nuclear testing by one nuclear weapon State and the recent decision made by another to resume testing. These developments are all the more regrettable, taking place so soon after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference during which the nuclear weapon States undertook, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing.

Sri Lanka, however, is pleased to note the undertakings given by these nuclear weapon States to conclude a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1996.

While expressing its concern at these unfortunate events, Sri Lanka urges the members of the Conference on Disarmament, to conduct their negotiations with renewed vigour to ensure the early conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. In this regard, Sri Lanka wishes to reiterate its strong conviction that the treaty should be comprehensive and without any provision for exceptions; universal and internationally and effectively verifiable. The CTBT should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments, for all time.

I would be grateful, if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1332
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 26 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO CONCERNING THE DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the international organizations having their headquarters at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the press release from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Government of Mexico concerning the decision by the Government of France to resume nuclear tests.

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would arrange for this text to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.95-62317 (E)

MEXICO'S CONCERN AT THE DECISION BY SOME COUNTRIES
TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR TESTS

Our country reaffirms its decision to continue fighting in the international forums responsible for negotiating the various aspects of disarmament.

Tlatelolco, D.F., 20 June 1995.

* * *

The Government of Mexico has communicated to the Governments of the nuclear Powers its concern at the decision by some of them to resume nuclear tests despite the exhortation by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that they should exercise utmost restraint in this regard.

It will be recalled that Mexico, supported by a large majority of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted at this recent Conference in New York a concrete proposal not only for the designation of 1996 as the time-limit for the conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning all nuclear tests without exception but also for the adoption of an immediate moratorium on this type of tests.

While Mexico's first proposal was adopted by consensus, the proposal to declare an immediate moratorium on nuclear tests was not accepted, precisely because of the opposition of some nuclear Powers. Instead, as we observe above, a paragraph was included in which the nuclear States are asked to exercise the utmost restraint in this regard.

Mexico feels that the nuclear test carried out by the Republic of China on 15 May last, the announcement by France of a series of nuclear tests to be carried out in the South Pacific and the statement by a senior United States representative to the effect that his country might also resume nuclear testing do not create a propitious climate for the performance of the series of important agreements adopted by consensus at the aforementioned Conference and jeopardize not only future disarmament negotiations but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear testing is the most direct method of improving military arsenals. That being so, it is inconceivable that anyone should wish to continue the arms race now, when the nuclear arsenals already in existence are estimated to be equivalent to one million times the yield of the Hiroshima atomic bomb, energy enough to wipe out the world's population forty times over.

In this context, Mexico reaffirms its decision to continue fighting in the international forums responsible for negotiating the various aspects of disarmament, to ensure that the goals that have been set are achieved and has, to that end, begun consultations with other countries that share its point of view.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1333
30 June 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 JUNE 1995 FROM THE ACTING HEAD OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HONOURABLE P.J. KEATING MP CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING BY FRANCE

Attached is the text of a statement by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP, concerning the resumption of nuclear testing by France.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Patrick Cole
Counsellor
Acting Head of Delegation

GE.95-62323 (E)

French Nuclear Testing

Statement by the Australian Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP

"Cabinet met last night to consider further Australia's response to President Chirac's announcement on 13 June that France would resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Cabinet's deliberations were against the background of the French rejection of the efforts of the South Pacific Forum delegation, led by Senator Evans, to persuade France not to proceed with the tests.

Australia's response to the French decision has been strong, unequivocal and concrete.

The Government has attacked the decision in very strong terms - first in a statement I issued on 14 June immediately following on President Chirac's announcement deploring the decision. I announced in that statement that the Government had frozen cooperation with France in the defence field. The language of that statement was repeated by the Foreign Minister, in Japan at the time, in a series of press conferences, and in a direct telephone conversation with the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Hervé de Charette. The Acting Foreign Minister called in the French Ambassador and issued a formal protest and our Ambassador did likewise in Paris.

The Government has also taken the lead in promoting a strong South Pacific regional action. On 15 June, I issued a statement as Chair of the Forum condemning the French decision, after consultations with my fellow South Pacific Forum Heads of Government. On 19 June Senator Evans led a delegation of Forum representatives which conveyed direct to the French Government the region's condemnation of the decision and the deep resentment it has aroused in the whole region.

The Government gave instructions to its embassies abroad to make our position known on the French decision. Many countries have expressed their opposition to the tests, including a number of our closest neighbours.

Australia has also made active use of multilateral forums to leave no doubt as to where we stand on this issue. We have expressed our outrage at the French decision in the United Nations in New York, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

On 19 June I made a speech in Parliament setting out the Government's views on the decision and Australia's relationship with France.

Concerned about flow-on consequences of the French decision, I have instructed our Ambassador in Washington to welcome the continued United States commitment to its moratorium and urge the United States to maintain its leadership in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) in terms acceptable not only to the nuclear-weapon States but the wider international

community. Our Ambassadors in Beijing, London and Moscow will also be making representations to the other nuclear-weapon States in favour of the moratorium on testing and early conclusion of the CTBT.

By any measure this amounts to an unequivocal response. I am in no doubt that the French are clear about our views.

Last night, Cabinet - after hearing a report and recommendations from Senator Evans - decided upon a series of further measures now to be taken and in the light of the outcome of the Forum delegation's visit to France, covering actions at the bilateral, regional and global level. These measures are in line with the Government's consistent policy on this issue which has been to respond in a measured, graduated way, leaving open every avenue from France to respond to South Pacific concerns.

In broad outline the proposed measures are as follows:

- The Government has decided that Australia's Ambassador in Paris is to be recalled for urgent consultations and briefing on how Australia can best continue to react to the French decision.

- The Government has decided to extend the curtailment of defence contacts with France in the areas of ship and aircraft visits, training, senior officer visits, material acquisition, and defence-related agreements and arrangements. The senior Australian defence force representative in Paris will be recalled. (In relation to the curtailment of aircraft visits, the Department of Defence will take the operational steps required to continue to provide the same level of maritime surveillance to the Pacific Island countries.)

- The Government will convene a special meeting of South Pacific Environment Ministers to discuss the environmental impact of testing.

- The Government will be consulting with Forum countries on possible regional measures including the suspension of France's status as a South Pacific Forum dialogue partner for the duration of testing; a possible boycott by individual Forum countries of the South Pacific games to be held in French Polynesia in August; and the formation of a Forum regional action committee to coordinate responses to France's decision, mobilize and support community campaigns in Forum countries, and report to the Madang Forum in September.

- The Government will be consulting with Forum countries on the desirability of a public information campaign being mobilized in France to sensitize public opinion to the strength of regional opposition to French testing and the reasons for it.

- At a wider international level, Australian delegations and representatives will take advantage of all available opportunities to register Australian and regional opposition to French testing in

the United Nations and all other appropriate multilateral bodies, including where appropriate through the initiation of resolutions.

- A high-level officials mission will be sent to nuclear-weapon States to argue the case for an acceptably drafted and quickly negotiated CTBT.

While it is not proposed to embark upon any trade or other direct economic restrictions, it should be noted that the existing policy of entering into no new contracts for the sale of uranium to France until France enters into a comprehensive test-ban treaty will remain in force.

The Government will keep the implementation and impact of the above measures under close review in the months ahead. We are determined to do everything we possibly and reasonably can to ensure that France understands the nature and extent of Australian and South Pacific opposition to its test resumption decision, and acts accordingly.

Canberra, 23 June 1995"

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1334
30 June 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 27 JUNE 1997 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL) CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

The Permanent Mission of Mexico to the International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith the declaration by the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) concerning France's resumption of nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The Permanent Mission of Mexico would be grateful if the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament would arrange for this text to be distributed as an official document of the Conference.

DECLARATION BY THE COUNCIL OF THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

On the occasion of its one hundred and fifty-second ordinary session, held on 15 June 1995 at the Agency's headquarters, the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) made the following declaration:

The Council of OPANAL, as an organ of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, deeply regrets the decision of the Government of France concerning the resumption of its nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

The Council of OPANAL firmly exhorts the Government of France to reconsider that decision and to refrain from conducting future tests. That decision may even affect the auspicious climate for the negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty being conducted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and jeopardize the important progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Moreover, the resumption of these nuclear tests may have irreparable consequences for the environment and harmful effects on human health.

Mexico City, 16 June 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1334/Corr.1
17 July 1995

ENGLISH ONLY

NOTE VERBALE DATED 27 JUNE 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MEXICO ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION BY THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL) CONCERNING FRANCE'S RESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Corrigendum

The title of document CD/1334 should read as above.

GE.95-62864

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1335
7 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY IN WASHINGTON ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Attached is a copy of a Statement issued by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement on the Occasion of the 27th Anniversary of the Opening for Signature of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - July 1, 1995

On July 1, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson and representatives from 60 other countries signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the East Room of the White House. Since the treaty was signed and entered into force in 1970, the NPT has achieved truly historic importance.

As of July 1, 1995, over 170 countries have become non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT, thereby making a legally binding commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, each one of the 179 NPT state parties, including the five nuclear weapon states, has agreed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament which remains our ultimate goal.

The last 12 months have been extremely productive for achieving our twin objectives of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing their number. Most importantly, in May 1995, the NPT state parties decided, without conditions, that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely in accordance with article x.2 of the treaty.

Other recent developments have also contributed to reducing the threat of nuclear war.

Since July 1 last year, 15 countries have become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, and Ukraine -- all of which have peaceful nuclear facilities. There remain only ten countries in the world that are not bound by the NPT or other comparable agreements. Of these ten, only three countries have not placed all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The United States has continued to dismantle nuclear weapons at a rate of between 1000 and 2000 per year. For the first time, the U.S. Has placed nuclear weapons material from its stockpile under IAEA safeguards.

In December 1994, the United States and Russia, together with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, brought the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) into force. Nine thousand nuclear weapons from U.S. and former Soviet strategic delivery vehicles will have been removed from deployment when the treaty is fully implemented.

In his January 21, 1995 State of the Union address, President Clinton called upon the Senate to approve START II. The Senate responded by beginning START II hearings on January 31. When START II is fully implemented, an additional 5,000 nuclear weapons will

have been removed from the deployed arsenals of the United States and Russia.

Also in January, the United States extended its moratorium on nuclear weapon testing until a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, on the assumption that a CTBT will be signed by September 30, 1996.

In March, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would withdraw permanently 200 metric tons of nuclear weapons material from its stockpile. The United States will also reduce its stockpile of high enriched uranium from nuclear weapons by converting it to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors. The U.S. has also agreed to purchase 500 metric tons in high enriched uranium, previously used in dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, which has been converted to low enriched uranium for use in power reactors.

Also in March, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States and Russia have agreed to cease production of plutonium for use in nuclear explosive devices. In April, the United Kingdom announced that it no longer produces fissile material for nuclear weapons.

In April, the U.S., UK, Russia, and France harmonized their policies prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are NPT parties except in the unlikely event of an attack by a non-nuclear weapon state allied or associated with a nuclear weapon state against a nuclear weapon state or its allies.

Also in April, the UN Security Council adopted by consensus a resolution setting forth in unprecedented detail the means by which to respond in the event that a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT is subject to nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the parties to the NPT agreed on an ambitious agenda including, inter alia, the adoption of the following measures and undertakings:

(a) universal adherence to the NPT as an urgent priority;

(b) a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996; pending entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear weapon states should exercise the "utmost restraint;"

(c) a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(d) the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally;

(e) the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be encouraged as a matter of priority;

(f) full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supplying nuclear equipment and material; and

(g) increasing the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

The NPT parties also agreed to strengthening and making more substantive the treaty's review process.

The United States fully supports this agenda and looks forward to its substantial implementation by the time of the next NPT Review Conference in the year 2000. In this context, we continue to urge all of the nuclear weapon states to join in a global moratorium on nuclear weapon testing as we work to complete a CTBT at the earliest possible time.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1336
10 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE DECISION OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE A MORATORIUM ON EXPORTS OF ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

As I had the pleasure to remark at our meeting of 8 June 1995, the Romanian Government has been examining the possibility of declaring a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel landmines, with the view to fully contributing to the current international efforts aimed at ridding the world of the scourge of these horrible weapons.

I can now inform you that a moratorium has already been approved and entered into force on 1 July 1995. The Romanian unilateral moratorium applies to all categories of anti-personnel landmines and it will last for an initial period of one year.

This decision crowns the Romanian stance on landmines and in particular our co-sponsorship of last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution on the establishment of moratoria in this field. Its significance redoubles since it came into force just days before the International Conference on Mine Clearance started its proceedings.

May I kindly ask that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1337
13 July 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PHILIPPINES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, HIS EXCELLENCY FIDEL V. RAMOS, CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

I have the honour to furnish you herewith a copy of the statement of the President of the Philippines, H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, concerning the decision of the Government of France to resume nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

I would appreciate it if the President's statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): LILIA R. BAUTISTA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF H.E. PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS ON THE FRENCH DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Manila, 21 June 1995

I wish to inform you that I have written personally to His Excellency Jacques Chirac, the President of the Republic of France, conveying to him the deep concern of the Philippine Government over the decision of his government to resume nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

I conveyed to the French President the Philippine view that a resumption of nuclear testing is inimical to the promotion of the kind of international climate we need in order to promote further nuclear arms control and disarmament. I reiterated the support of the Philippines for the eventual conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Our Department of Foreign Affairs also conveyed a diplomatic note to the French Embassy, and to the French Government through the Philippine Embassy in Paris, on the same subject. The note protested the French decision on the resumption of testing.

We sincerely hope that the government and people of France will reflect carefully on the concern and sentiments that have been so clearly expressed by the members of the international community, and most especially by our friends in the South Pacific who will be most directly affected by any hazardous consequences of nuclear testing.

At this point let me stress that the Philippines and France have traditionally enjoyed good relations in many fields. We will continue developing this relationship, which has proven to be mutually beneficial, and which has the potential for even greater growth and diversification in the years ahead. It was precisely the intention of my visit to France last year to deepen and broaden our bilateral ties, considering that we have a great deal of interest in both countries to bring Europe and Asia closer together through our mutual interaction.

At the same time, we are dismayed at this decision of the French Government, which has tremendous implications upon both international and regional security and stability. As a friend of France in the Asia-Pacific, the Philippines calls on the French government to recognize its responsibilities in a global context by seriously and immediately reconsidering its decision.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1338
10 August 1995

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 9 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UKRAINE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE CONCERNING FRANCE'S DECISION TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING

I have the honour to forward to you the text of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the decision made by France to resume nuclear tests, dated 13 July 1995.

Please take the appropriate steps to register this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, and to have it distributed to all member States' and non-member States' delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) Olexander Slipchenko
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Ukraine
Head of delegation

STATEMENT
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
concerning France's decision to resume nuclear testing

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine wishes to express its profound concern at the decision taken by France to resume nuclear testing in the south Pacific.

This step, taken by France soon after the completion of the work of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which adopted the historic decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, conflicts with the provisions of the document adopted by the Conference on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and will not promote the development of the positive trends which have recently been observed in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The ending of the moratorium and the resumption of testing run counter to the agreement of the nuclear States to exercise "utmost restraint" pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), as well as the reaffirmation of the conviction that "the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones ... enhances global and regional peace and security".

The resumption of nuclear testing by France may call into question the prospect of the successful completion no later than 1996 of the negotiations on a CTBT being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, which in turn will slow down the implementation of other measures in the sphere of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ukraine, which has demonstrated by means of practical actions the consistency of its foreign policy in strengthening the global regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, calls on France to take all necessary steps to ensure the speediest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT), to review its decision to resume nuclear testing and to join other nuclear States in complying with the moratorium on the conduct of such tests.

13 July 1995

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1339
10 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CIRCULATED BY ARGENTINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (S/1995/567)

1. The G-21 takes note of the draft resolution circulated to members of the Security Council regarding the proposed role for the Security Council on the question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

2. The G-21 notes with concern that the draft resolution is silent on the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on nuclear disarmament and on the continued existence and retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. In the Group's view, the huge nuclear weapons stockpiles in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States, continuing qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons systems and the development and production of new nuclear weapons must constitute a priority in the field of multilateral disarmament since these represent a grave danger to international peace and security. It is this issue which should be of special concern to the Security Council, in view of the overwhelming demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, recognized and voiced in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

3. The Group believes that non-proliferation, in all its aspects, can be best promoted through the adoption and implementation of a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated Treaty for elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) commenced negotiations on such a Treaty. This would be consistent with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions which aim to eliminate respective categories of weapons of mass destruction entirely.

4. Any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the United Nations Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress for the violations of their provisions. It would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the CD.

5. In this context, the Group reiterates its position that the CD is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. Circumventing the CD or undermining the provisions of the existing treaties will seriously prejudice the ongoing negotiations in the CD on the CTBT and other issues.

GE.95-63421 (E)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1340
17 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MADE ON 11 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTING POLICY AND A WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET ISSUED ALSO ON 11 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING UNITED STATES CTBT SAFEGUARDS

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the President of the United States, made on 11 August 1995, concerning United States nuclear testing policy, and a White House Fact Sheet, issued also on 11 August, concerning United States CTBT Safeguards.

I would be grateful if you would issue these texts as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed) Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Statement by President Clinton, 11 August 1995, The White House

Today I am announcing my decision to negotiate a true zero yield comprehensive test ban. This is an historic milestone in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat to build a safe world. The United States will now insist on a test ban that prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion. I am convinced this decision will speed the negotiations so that we can achieve our goal of signing a comprehensive test ban next year.

As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness.

They also specify the circumstances under which I would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under a comprehensive test ban to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.

As a part of this arrangement I am today directing the establishment of a new annual reporting and certification requirement that will ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable under a comprehensive test ban.

I appreciate the time, the energy and the wisdom that the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have all devoted to the review of this crucial national security issue over the last several months.

American leaders since Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy have believed a comprehensive test ban would be a major stride toward stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now, as then, such a treaty would greatly strengthen the security of the United States and nations throughout the world. But now, unlike then, such a treaty is within our reach.

It would build upon the successes we have achieved so far: securing a permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; freezing North Korea's nuclear program; cutting existing nuclear arsenals by putting the START I Treaty into force; persuading Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up their nuclear weapons and to reach agreements with Russia that now mean that both our nations no longer target our missiles at each other.

A comprehensive test ban is the right step as we continue pulling back from the nuclear precipice, a precipice which we began to live with 50 years ago this week. It moves us one step closer to the day when no nuclear weapons are detonated anywhere on the face of the Earth.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

11 August 1995

Fact sheet: Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Safeguards

A Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is conditioned on:

A. The conduct of a Science-based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs.

B. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

C. The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty.

D. Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty-monitoring capabilities and operations.

E. The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.

F. The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) - advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command - that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear-weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1341
22 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE FORTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its forty-first formal session from 7 to 18 August 1995, in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the thirty-third session of the Group, convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.

2. The Ad Hoc Group is open to all Member States of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also open on a standing basis to all non-Member States which have been invited upon their request by the Conference on Disarmament to participate in its work. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Scientific experts and representatives from the following non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine.

4. During the session 63 papers containing information on national investigations related to the work of the Group were presented by participating experts. These working papers not only described the individual operational aspects of the participation in GSETT-3 but also contained important information related to the evaluation of the experiment. In addition, substantial technical and scientific material was presented by the three GSETT-3 Working Groups on Planning, Operations and Evaluation.

5. The Group reviewed results from its Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, which successfully began full-scale operations on 1 January 1995. As stated in CD/1254, the primary objectives of GSETT-3 are to:

- Develop and test new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), building upon previous experience;

- Provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;

- Develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an International Seismic Monitoring System.

The concepts for an experimental seismic monitoring system to be tested during GSETT-3 include: a single centralized International Data Centre (IDC), a specifically designed high-quality seismographic network consisting of about 50 primary (Alpha) stations and 100-150 auxiliary (Beta) stations, National Data Centres (NDCs) in participating countries, and a modern communications system to support data exchange among these elements.

The IDC has been in operation since 1 January 1995, with the processing and analysis methods at the IDC being continuously improved as experience is gained. As of this date, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the tables and figures attached to this Report.

The global station coverage is presently uneven, and many of the conclusions drawn are based on observational data from selected regions only. These are regions with station coverage corresponding to the original GSETT-3 plan, and the observational results are supplemented by theoretical modelling and are continuously evaluated. Although the number of stations currently participating falls short of that envisaged when the experiment was planned, there is wide enough participation to begin to draw practical conclusions regarding several aspects of the ISMS concept. Some of the most important conclusions are summarized below, with additional details provided in Annex 1.

6. The GSETT-3 has demonstrated the following technical results:

(a) The overall concept of a system based on a single IDC, NDCs in participating States and a two-tiered network of primary and auxiliary stations is an efficient concept for an International Seismological Monitoring System.

(b) A single International Data Centre, of the structure and size established during GSETT-3, can acquire and archive the volume of seismic data that is anticipated from the IMS to be established under a CTBT. It has been shown that a single IDC can routinely analyze this large volume of data in a timely manner and produce and distribute a set of defined products that are usable and useful for seismological monitoring and system evaluation. Additional work is needed, however, to further develop methods to provide characterization parameters and for providing user-friendly reporting products.

(c) The joint processing at the IDC of continuous data from a select, high-quality network of primary seismic stations is an effective means of detecting seismic events and achieving a preliminary location.

(d) Full redundancy of key equipment at the IDC is essential for reliable operations and to avoid loss of data. Key elements of the ISMS must be improved in terms of robustness and, often, redundancy in order to provide the 99% or higher reliability specified in CD/1254.

(e) NDCs play a critical role in the operation and maintenance of reliable stations and communication links, and form an effective interface between the IDC and participating States through which data and products can be accessed and evaluated.

(f) Regional communication nodes have proved useful during GSETT-3 and could, if equipped with sufficient redundancy, provide a back-up data storage capability if the IDC failed catastrophically. NDCs also have a useful back-up function.

(g) Seismic arrays at low noise sites will be the most valuable type of installation in the primary network of the seismic component of any proposed IMS. The GSETT-3 has shown the value of upgrading stations from three components to arrays. Digital data from stations with high operational capability and reliability are essential.

(h) The capability of the IDC to routinely and automatically retrieve supplementary data on request from a global network of auxiliary stations has been demonstrated.

(i) Limited experiments have been conducted to demonstrate mechanisms for system integrity, including data authentication. Further development and testing of authentication procedures and data and system security are, however, needed.

(j) The GSETT-3 has proven to be a valuable impetus to countries participating in the experiment for the installation of high-quality seismic equipment and communications equipment.

(k) The experiment has shown the necessity for stations to meet defined minimum technical specifications. The minimum recommended station requirements provided in CD/1254 is confirmed by the experience of GSETT-3 thus far.

(l) There has been a considerable and lengthy effort to establish the infrastructure needed for GSETT-3, including the stations, NDCs, the IDC and the communications links. The Ad Hoc Group considers it essential that the operation of key elements of this infrastructure that could contribute to the future IMS established under a CTBT be maintained.

7. The scientific results and capabilities demonstrated in GSETT-3 are not uniform in a geographical sense. Nevertheless, results to date allow the following preliminary points to be made:

(a) Considerable operational experience is necessary to achieve the potential capability of a seismic monitoring network. The capability of the GSETT-3 network has steadily improved since the beginning of the experiment. These improvements have been brought about by improvements in operational procedures at all levels, by improved data processing methods and by the addition of stations in the network.

(b) In regions of the world for which the planned primary network is nearly complete (i.e., North America, northern Europe, Australia), the network detects events with a magnitude of 3.5-4.0 with high probability. This supports the previous theoretical estimates of the global detection capability of a 50-60 station primary network and gives confidence that these theoretical estimates are correct on a global basis. However, the current capability is significantly less in other regions of the world, and must be improved.

(c) The combination of the primary network and an auxiliary network should be able to achieve a location accuracy of within 1,000 square kilometres. In regions of the world for which the planned network is nearly complete (i.e., North America, northern Europe, Australia), the location error of the primary network is estimated to be between 20-50 km for seismic events of magnitude 4. The use of auxiliary stations can reduce this to 15-25 km, based on GSETT-3 experience in the same areas. Previous work has demonstrated that calibration of the network can further improve location estimates, and this remains to be demonstrated in selected regions during GSETT-3.

(d) Participating countries have made available to the IDC supplementary information on seismic events based on analysing data from their own national networks, which are maintained to individual national standards. These supplementary data have proven useful in evaluating the performance of the GSETT-3 network and should be useful in improving the capability of the network by calibration.

(e) The experiment has shown that the current seismological network is inadequate for monitoring the southern oceanic areas. Data from a hydroacoustic network in these regions used in conjunction with the seismic network might be essential for monitoring seismic events of magnitude below 4 in these areas. More work is needed on this topic.

8. Costs

(a) GSETT-3 has reconfirmed the estimate made in CD/1254 that the investment costs for the GSETT-3 stations, communications links and IDC are approximately 180 million US$. This number comprises 150 million US$ invested prior to GSETT-3 and 30 million US$ in new investments.

(c) GSETT-3 has also reconfirmed the estimate made in CD/1254 that the yearly operations and maintenance costs for the GSETT-3 stations, communications links and IDC are approximately 30 million US$.

9. Documentation, Training and Participation

(a) A complete set of comprehensive Operational Manuals have been compiled for seismic stations, NDCs and the IDC. These Operational Manuals have proven essential to support the GSETT-3 system operations, data exchange and processing. These manuals should prove useful models for the Operations Manuals for the future ISMS.

(b) The GSETT-3 has demonstrated the importance of practical training of international staff at the IDC and of national staff at NDCs. This training, which is already taking place, should be continued and expanded.

(c) The GSETT-3 has also demonstrated that an international technical staff can work effectively together at the IDC. In fact, this international participation in the IDC work has been crucial to the success of GSETT-3.

10. Future plans

The Ad Hoc Group also discussed its future plans. The Group agreed upon a work program which is presented below. This work program gives an overview of and schedule for the remaining tasks envisaged for the completion and evaluation of the GSETT-3 monitoring system.

(a) Development of the GSETT-3 System

The Ad Hoc Group will provide continuing improvements to the operational procedures and methods for the system. For example, the following specific efforts are underway:

- Network Development: There will be a continuation of the step-by-step implementation of additional seismic facilities around the world. Efforts will be made to make the primary network of the GSETT-3 fully operational as envisaged by GSE and mentioned in Tables 1 and 2 in Annex 2. Efforts will also be made to supplement all the auxiliary stations offered by various countries and mentioned in the tables in Annex 2. Plans are underway to hold regional workshops in Africa and South America to increase participation of auxiliary stations.

- Communications: Work will continue to establish modern communications for reliable data transmission from stations in remote regions of China, Egypt, Pakistan and Russia. Efforts are also underway to explore new methods for reliable and cost-effective communications that offer redundant transmission paths between stations and data centres.

- International Data Centre: The IDC will incorporate new software to support a demonstration of calibration of the network and processing systems in selected regions. It will continue to issue a daily, high-quality bulletin of events and provide subscription services for all participants. The IDC products will be expanded to include additional event characterization parameters and to provide user-friendly reporting products that are useful to support both technical evaluation and national verification needs.

(b) Evaluation and Completion of GSETT-3

The Ad Hoc Group will complete a comprehensive evaluation of the first year of the GSETT-3 experiment with emphasis on specific technical issues that are needed to define the IMS. Based on this evaluation, the Group will develop a schedule and plan for the completion of GSETT-3.

(c) Transition of the GSETT-3 System and Experience

The Ad Hoc Group will examine the issues to be addressed in a transition from GSETT-3 to IMS operations. The Ad Hoc Group will develop a plan to address these issues, and thus would be prepared for a possible request by the CD. The Group will also continue to expand training programs in data processing and seismic data analysis at both the IDC and through national initiatives, and complete documentation of the operational aspects of GSETT-3 will be updated and expanded as a model for developing procedures for the IMS.

The above tasks will be completed in accordance with the following schedule:

August 1995- February 1996	Continue development of the GSETT-3 system, as described in section (a), with emphasis on improving network coverage, communications and IDC products and services.
November 1995	Complete the first draft of an evaluation report on the GSETT-3. Develop plan for completing GSETT-3.
	Develop initial list of auxiliary stations recommended for the seismic component of the IMS network.
	Develop initial draft plan for the transition of the GSETT-3 network to the IMS network.
	Meet in Geneva to discuss draft report, auxiliary station recommendations and GSETT-3 to IMS transition plan.
November 1995- February 1996	Complete the evaluation of the first year of GSETT-3. Develop and implement network calibration procedures.
February 1996	Meet in Geneva to complete a comprehensive report providing an evaluation of GSETT-3, based on the first year of operations.

Adopt plan for completion and transition of the GSETT-3 system to IMS.

Complete report on recommendation for auxiliary stations.

11. It was noted that facilities are incomplete for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is of particular importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission, and for operation of other facilities during GSETT-3. Countries are encouraged to assist by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

12. The Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee's Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, the Ad Hoc Group made a presentation to the Working Group on the GSETT-3 experiment.

13. The Ad Hoc Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop "From GSETT-3 to IMS" in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, from 26 through 29 June 1995. The workshop was attended by 55 technical experts from 20 countries. The objective of the workshop was to stimulate discussion on the evaluation and evolution of GSETT-3, and to consider ways to facilitate the transition of the experience gained from GSETT-3 to meet the needs of the Conference on Disarmament and of the future CTBT international organization. Many of the results of this workshop were provided during this session in reports of the national delegations and the Working Groups, and these reports will be valuable in guiding and expediting the future work of the GSE.

The Ad Hoc Group also noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical seminar "Design, Usage, and Implementation of the AutoDRM" in Zurich, Switzerland, from 1 to 2 June 1995. This seminar, whose purpose was to consider common procedures for automated data exchange, was attended by 18 technical experts from 12 countries.

The Ad Hoc Group likewise noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical seminar which was held in Bruyères le Châtel, France, from 12 to 13 July 1995 and attended by 17 participants from 7 European countries. The purpose of this seminar was to review initial results of the EUROBULL experiment, whose objective is to produce a high quality European seismic bulletin on a routine basis. Plans for continuation and expanding the participation were also discussed.

14. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next sessions, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 November through 1 December 1995, followed by a session from 12 through 23 February 1996, to carry out the work plan presented in paragraph 10. A draft work programme for the next session is presented in Annex 3. The work programme will be tailored to meet as much as practicable the information needs of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and its Working Group on Verification.

Annex 1

Summary Report on Status and Plans for GSETT-3

1. Introduction

On 1 January 1995, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) Third Technical Test, GSETT-3, successfully began full-scale operations. As stated in CD/1254, the primary objectives of GSETT-3 are to:

- Develop and test new concepts for an experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), building upon previous experience;

- Provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the Conference on Disarmament with timely technical information;

- Develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an International Seismic Monitoring System.

The concepts for an experimental seismic monitoring system to be tested during GSETT-3 include: a single centralized International Data Centre (IDC), a specifically designed high-quality seismographic network consisting of about 50 primary (Alpha) stations and 100-150 auxiliary (Beta) stations, National Data Centres (NDCs) in participating countries, and a modern communications system to support data exchange among these elements.

The IDC has been in operation since 1 January 1995, with the processing and analysis methods at the IDC being continuously improved as experience is gained. As of this date, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the tables and figures in Annex 2.

The global station coverage is presently uneven, and many of the conclusions drawn are based on observational data from selected regions only. These are regions with station coverage corresponding to the original GSETT-3 plan, and the observational results are supplemented by theoretical modelling and are continuously evaluated. Although the number of stations currently participating falls short of that envisaged when the experiment was planned, there is wide enough participation to begin to draw practical conclusions regarding several aspects of the ISMS concept. Some of the most important conclusions are summarized in the Progress Report, and additional details are provided below.

2. GSETT-3 Participation

The global seismograph network envisaged for GSETT-3 is a two-tiered network comprising the so-called primary and auxiliary seismograph stations. The primary stations are designed and located to provide

detection and initial location of seismic events throughout the world. The station waveform data are telemetered continuously to the IDC.

The auxiliary stations provide supplementary data, so that events can be located and characterized with improved accuracy. Data from auxiliary stations are not telemetered continuously to the IDC, but waveform segments can be retrieved automatically.

2.1 Primary stations

As of 18 August 1995, 37 stations in the envisaged 60-station GSETT-3 primary network are providing data to the IDC. Only five primary stations have been added to the network since the 40th GSE session in February, which is somewhat disappointing in view of the fact that 49 primary stations were committed for participation already by the time of the February session. It is, however, realistic to assume that at least an additional 5 primary stations will soon take part in GSETT-3, based on information received from primary station host countries during the 41st session. The work related to obtaining commitments for the remaining stations of the primary network has continued, most notably by a visit in May to several Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York.

2.2 Auxiliary stations

As of 18 August 1995, 106 stations have been offered for the auxiliary station network and 99 of these have been committed for participation in GSETT-3. Out of these 99 stations, 75 are currently used by the IDC, which is an increase from 44 at the time of the 40th GSE session. Still, the geographical distribution of the current auxiliary station network is rather uneven, and many additional candidate auxiliary stations around the world that meet the technical requirements and that are of potential usefulness to GSETT-3 have been identified, in close cooperation with the member networks of the Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN).

The GSE is seeking formal commitments for participation in GSETT-3 in direct contact with the authorities of the host countries of such candidate stations. Many positive responses have been received to letters written by the GSE Chairman, but 16 countries have not yet responded to such requests. For some countries, positive responses have been received, but work is underway to determine to which station(s) the commitment received actually applies.

It is still conceivable that the number of auxiliary stations in the GSETT-3 network might approach 150.

3. GSETT-3 Operations

After the flurry of activity which resulted from preparations for the successful start of the full scale test on 1 January 1995, operational procedures at both the NDCs and at the IDC have become more routine with the result that attention is now being directed towards optimizing the whole of the GSETT-3 system and improving its capabilities. A detailed

statistical overview of IDC operations and, to a lesser extent, of station and NDC participation, is provided in the bi-weekly performance reports. These reports may be retrieved electronically using the file transfer protocol (ftp) or by interacting with the IDC World-Wide Web(WWW) server on the Internet.

3.1 Status

As Table 1 shows, there are now 33 countries actively participating in GSETT-3 by submitting data to and/or retrieving data from the IDC. Although the station distribution is still far from uniform, data are arriving at the IDC from every continent. The number of primary stations sending continuous, near-real time data to the IDC has increased to 37 while the number of auxiliary stations accessed by the IDC has increased to 75. Communications links and data transmission software from the primary stations to the IDC (often through a communications hub at an NDC) have performed adequately. As a result of further upgrading of the procedures at the IDC, NDC and stations, the reliability of acquiring data from auxiliary stations using direct dial-up and GSE automatic Data Request Manager (AutoDRM) messages via electronic mail, has improved markedly.

Fourteen NDCs (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) are submitting Gamma data in the form of independent seismic event lists. These data are typically more than one month behind real time but are still useful for evaluating and calibrating the GSETT-3 network. These data are now parsed automatically into the IDC database and are available for on-line access by the NDCs.

Starting 1 January 1995, the IDC began full-scale operation seven days per week and 24 hours per day. The IDC produces automatically an Alpha Event List (AEL) based on signals detected in the real time, continuous waveform data from primary stations. Auxiliary waveform segments, which are based on AEL event locations, are then automatically retrieved and an Alpha/Beta Event List (ABEL) is produced. The waveform data is interactively reviewed to produce a Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB). The target times for completing the automatic bulletins are 1 hour (AEL) and 4 hours (ABEL) after event time. The target time for the REB is two days after the end of the data day. With minor exceptions, which have been associated either with large aftershock sequences or with instabilities in a developing system, these target times have been adhered to. REBs have been produced for all data days except for the period 8 May through 14 May when a major malfunction in the redundant array of independent disks prevented data recovery from both the on-line primary and back-up versions of the IDC database. To ensure that any future failures will not have the same consequences, the IDC now maintains three copies of all current on-line data.

Table 1

	1 Feb 1994	20 Aug 1994	20 Feb 1995	18 Aug 1995	Plan
Participating Nations	10	13	28	33	>40
Primary Stations	6	12	32	37	60
Auxiliary Stations	13	21	44	75	~150
Coverage	European	Sparse Global	Global	Global	Global
NDCs Sending Gamma Data	1	5	11	14	20-30
Volume of Data/Day to IDC	0.2 Gbytes	1.5 Gbytes	2.5 Gbytes	2.5 Gbytes	>5 Gbytes
Data Days/Week	2	3	7(24 hrs/ day)	7 (24 hrs/day)	7(24hrs /day)
REB Events/day	20	20	60	60	>100
REB Events Total	1,500	2,700	6,800	12,250	
IDC Staff (int'l)	27(0)	27(0)	47(9)	50(10)	50(9)

There are on average more than 60 events in the REBs each day. This number is not constant but fluctuates widely to over 200 events per day when large earthquakes with their consequent aftershock sequences occur. That both the system and analysis staff can handle these increased loads is encouraging.

Estimates of the magnitude threshold at the 90% confidence level, for detection of a seismic disturbance by three stations in the primary network, range from mb 3.1 in limited areas of northern Europe up to mb 4.7 in the southern oceans. These estimates reflect the geographical distribution and detection capabilities of stations in the current primary network. Typical location uncertainties for events within 2000 km of the closest station are between 40 and 50 km. Completion and calibration of the station network by the use of regional, rather than globally averaged, travel times will improve the detection capability and reduce the location uncertainty.

The number of staff at the IDC is now 50, including 10 international visiting experts. International staffing and training continues to be a high priority of the Working Group on Operations. At the last GSE session, a Working Group paper was tabled inviting GSETT-3 participants to apply for positions at the IDC. The responses have been reviewed during the current session and offers will be extended to the successful candidates.

The IDC is not an operational system; rather it is a prototype system that is evolutionary in nature and is changing as information is gathered during the GSETT-3, as new analysis algorithms are developed and as existing algorithms are improved. Signal processing and automatic association of arrivals to seismic events are major components of the data processing and interpretation segment of the IDC. The signal processing module detects seismic signals and extracts features for subsequent processing and interpretation. These features include signal onset time, azimuth and slowness, polarization parameters, amplitudes, period, signal/noise ratio and others. Based on these features, the automatic association module group detections that appear to come from the same event identify the seismic phases in terms of wave type and propagation paths, and locate events using theoretical Earth models.

The signal processing modules will be replaced with a single new program called DFX (Detection and Feature Extraction). The objectives of this new software package are to improve the quality control and robustness of the feature measurements, generalize the knowledge representation, facilitate the addition of new algorithms and ensure consistency between results from automatic analysis and analyst review. The modules which are used for automatic event association and event location will also be replaced with a new collection of programs called the Global Association (GA) system which uses a gridded search technique. The objectives have been to speed up the event formation process through parallelization and to improve the quality of the automated event lists by reducing the number of missed events.

Surface wave magnitudes (Ms) are an important diagnostic parameter for characterizing the source of the larger events. In May, an automatic procedure for identifying surface waves, estimating their amplitudes and calculating surface wave magnitudes, was implemented at the IDC. Initially, Ms was only calculated for stations with long period channels. Subsequent enhancements of these automatic procedures allow for the computation of surface wave magnitudes from broad-band data channels and long-period arrays. Regional magnitudes (ML) are now also being calculated automatically and included in the REBs. The current automatic procedures use a set of standardized attenuation curves. Regional specific attenuation curves will be incorporated as they become available.

Significant enhancements have been made to the automatic auxiliary data retrieval system with the result that the IDC is now requesting, retrieving and processing much more auxiliary data than earlier in the year. Auxiliary data is currently being requested for about half of the events reported in the REBs. The use of auxiliary data together with analyst review are the major factors in reducing location errors and in improving the quality of the REBs. One of the consequences of the

increased auxiliary data contributions has been the discovery of anomalies in instrument response that have been supplied to the IDC, and which have been responsible for some of the station magnitude outliers reported in the REB. IDC staff have worked with NDCs and station operators to correct and update this information as necessary.

An important objective of the IDC data processing is to optimize the automatic procedures and so reduce the amount of interactive analysis. A study of signal processing results for the period 19 February - 1 April has been used to develop new automatic detection parameter recipes for all stations in the primary network. These new recipes were implemented on 2 June and have significantly reduced the number of false detections. At the same time the number of valid detections has increased. Further optimization of these detection recipes will be carried out at periodic intervals.

The data access facilities at the IDC continue to improve. Since the last session, access facilities to the IDC database using the GSE AutoDRM and electronic mail have been upgraded.

The options for obtaining information by subscription have also been extended. It is now possible to tailor subscription requests to obtain bulletin information which is restricted to events from nominated areas, and have magnitudes and depths within specified limits, etc. The IDC World Wide Web (WWW) server has been extensively upgraded and expanded to improve its functionality, to make it more user friendly and to provide access to a larger range of IDC products and services.

The GSETT-3 IDC is not providing identification on detected events, but it has begun compiling a number of agreed parameters which characterize the detected signals and which may assist participating countries in identifying the source of each seismic disturbance. In preparation for adding these event characterization parameters to the near-real time operational pipeline, the IDC has gone back to compute the first subset of these parameters for a one-month period in January and February. Further subsets will be computed as resources permit. NDCs have been invited to access these characterization parameters and to provide comments on them, including: are the parameters computed correctly; are they useful; and which additional parameters might also be useful.

3.2 Operational Plans

A number of significant changes are expected to take place within the IDC over the next six months. It is expected that between 10 and 15 new primary stations, 20 to 40 new auxiliary stations and Gamma data from additional NDCs will be available during this period. The further refinement of the primary and auxiliary acquisition systems will be an important accompaniment to these new data sources. Additional hardware, including a 5 terabyte mass store, will be added to the system. This mass store will allow all raw data and processed products to be accessible, on-line, for a period of several years.

Further upgrading and tuning of the signal processing, automatic association and location software, and the incorporation of an expanded knowledge base into this software, will increase the quality of the IDC products. It will also reduce the analysts' workload. The knowledge base will include regional specific travel times and attenuation curves as well as event locations and source types (Gamma data). Acquiring this knowledge and incorporating it into the IDC processing systems will be a priority and will require active participation and contributions from all NDCs as well as from the IDC. To facilitate participation, Points of Contact (POC) personnel have been nominated at the IDC. The role of these POCs is to act as liaison officers between the NDCs and the various aspects of the IDC operations.

The IDC products will be expanded to include additional event characterization parameters. All IDC data and processed products will be more easily accessible as a result of additional functionality being incorporated into the IDC AutoDRM, the Subscription modules and the WWW server.

4. GSETT-3 Documentation

The GSETT-3 Documentation, CRP/243, comprises the plan for GSETT-3, technical instructions, factual descriptions of facilities to be used, an evaluation plan and numerous technical annexes. This voluminous documentation forms the basis for operations manuals and procedures for GSETT-3. It will also contain technical summaries of IDC and station operations and ongoing evaluation results during GSETT-3. Previous experience has shown that documentation of this type is essential.

A draft version of the GSETT-3 Documentation was produced and distributed in advance of the 39th GSE session in August 1994, and an updated version of this documentation was distributed during the 40th GSE session in February 1995.

Since the 40th session, work has continued to finalize the GSETT-3 documentation, and significant progress was made at a documentation meeting in the United States in May. During and following this meeting, missing text was added, the volumes and annexes were unified with respect to format, style and content, and the documentation was slightly reorganized relative to previous versions. The completed GSETT-3 Documentation is being mailed to the home addresses of GSE delegates.

5. GSETT-3 Evaluation

The Working Group on Evaluation (WGE) visited the prototype International Data Centre (IDC) at the end of June 1995 to prepare its second Evaluation Report on the Experimental International Seismic Monitoring System (EISMS), covering the six-month period from January to June 1995. This evaluation took advantage of many national contributions presented during the GSE Informal Technical Workshop in Baltimore (26 to 29 June).

5.1 Status

Currently there are 37 primary stations (8 more than in January 1995) on-line to the IDC and routine analysis shows that almost all are of high quality, with low noise levels. Although a wide variety of instrumentation is employed at the current primary stations, no adverse effects have been observed. The auxiliary network currently consists of 75 stations. Their number has increased steadily and their impact on event location capability has been clearly demonstrated for some source regions. Nevertheless, application of corrections on azimuth and travel times to take into account the effect of local geology, as recommended in the previous WGE report, is still needed.

The communication links continue to show high reliability, independent of the physical means used (satellite, fibre optic, cable, etc). However, the overall data availability from most of the primary stations (due to a combination of communications links, NDC, IDC and station problems) is far from meeting the 99% target for EISMS stations. Testing of data authentication procedures will be conducted during the next few months.

To date, fifty countries are committed to participating in GSETT-3 and many are in the process of establishing their NDC to provide data and to evaluate their contributions. These NDCs are obviously giving priority to establishing and maintaining their primary and auxiliary stations, thus limiting the time for participation in evaluation tasks. However, the number and quality of papers presented at the Baltimore Workshop was encouraging and shows that many NDCs are aware of the need for their contribution to the evaluation of GSETT-3. The WGE must stress that many more NDCs need to participate in evaluation tasks by sending their Evaluation Reports to the IDC. The information contained in such reports is needed to assess many aspects of the GSETT-3 experiment, including the costs.

The total cost of the IDC operations is 10 million US$ for the present fiscal year, including technical support, communications, development and salaries for a staff of 50 people devoted to operations (23), technical support (17) and other services. In May/June 1995, a quality assurance evaluation of the IDC was carried out. The chief findings were that the contribution of the international experts working at the IDC has been significant, but that the security of the system against data loss is inadequate. The back-up of data to ensure no loss in case of hardware failure needs to be improved. This was clearly demonstrated recently when a disk crash put the IDC out of operation for 6 days and lead to the loss of primary data during that period. More generally, the frequency of serious system failures needs to be reduced.

Reviewed Event Bulletins (REBs) are generated on a daily basis and the basic statistics necessary for the evaluation of GSETT-3 are being accumulated, but the reliability of these processes might be affected by recurrent disk crashes or software problems.

The AutoDRM has been improved and provides more functions, although some of the functions are still missing and responses remain irregular. The IDC contribution through the World Wide Web (WWW) has also improved.

Gamma (or contributed) data are now parsed or inserted into the IDC data base and the retrieval mechanism for data from auxiliary stations is performing better although it still needs improvement.

So far the IDC has concentrated on operations, and tuning of event detection processes has been a low priority task. The problem of spurious detections needs to be solved. Additionally, clear signals with no automatic detection by IDC processes have been identified.

In May 1995, the IDC started processing surface waves from stations with long period instruments, and, more recently, on stations with broad band instruments. MS and ML magnitudes are now computed on a routine basis.

Significant progress has been achieved since February 1995 on event definition, resulting in automatically formed event lists that are closer to the final REB products. However, 20-30% of the events in the final REB are added during analyst review and about 40% of the events automatically formed are rejected by analysts. Since January, the fraction of REB events for which auxiliary data have been retrieved has been nearly constant at around 50 to 60%, which is too low. This is probably due to missing events in the automatic event list, inadequate criteria for data retrieval, technical problems with auxiliary data retrieval, and the sparse and uneven distribution of auxiliary stations.

5.2 Capabilities

The event location capability of the EISMS can be improved with the use of auxiliary data; the size of the confidence ellipse could be reduced particularly in cases where the nearest primary stations are located at far regional or teleseismic distances.

Several NDCs have compared the REB locations with their Gamma data. In the United States (US), the mean location difference was 35 km, in Japan 50 km, in Spain 80 km and in Finland and nearby countries no more than 20 km. A global approach compared REB locations with those in the weekly version of the Preliminary Determination of Epicentres (PDE, a standard worldwide bulletin published in the US). A result of this comparison was that the median location difference for common events decreased from several tens of kilometres at magnitude (mb) 3.5 to about 20 km at magnitudes above 5.5. Nevertheless, another study of IDC results showed that only 20% of the events in the REB had confidence ellipses with areas less than 1,000 km and 35% have confidence ellipses with areas exceeding 10,000 km.

The depths of focus for deep events in the REBs usually compared well with depths given in other bulletins, but this is not so for shallow events. Depths were estimated for only 30% of events reported in the REB.

A questionnaire was distributed to the NDCs in order for the WGE to assess quality of bulletins based on Gamma data. To date 22 out of 28 NDCs have responded to the questionnaire. The WGE urges NDCs that have not responded to do so.

As observed in the IDC Performance Reports, the detection capability of the network has not significantly changed since February 1995, i.e., the network event detection threshold varies from (mb) 3.5 - 4.5 and may be even higher in some regions of the southern hemisphere. These estimates are in good agreement with theoretical simulations and reflect the uneven distribution of stations with sparse coverage of Africa, South America and much of Asia.

5.3 Evaluation plans

In summary, there have been significant improvements in both data processing and procedures during the past six months. However, there are still some important goals to be achieved. Most urgent is the necessity of greater involvement of NDCs both in the contribution of stations and in participation in evaluation tasks. The IDC should continue to improve the quality assurance procedures and provide a documented plan to calibrate and tune the network. The IDC should also give priority to refining automatic procedures and event location, including depth estimation, especially for shallow events.

The next evaluation period should confirm the increased performance of the EISMS through the application of such recommendations.

Annex 2

Table 1: Status of GSETT3 Station and Gamma Data Commitments as of 18 August 1995

Country	Alpha Stations Envisaged by GSE	Beta Stations Offered	Station Commitment Status	Data Available to IDC	Gamma Data Committed
Argentina	1	1	committed	1994/Jan. 1996	yes
Australia	5	12	committed	1994	yes
Austria	0	1	lacking	1995	-
Belgium	0	0	not applicable	not applicable	yes
Bolivia	1	-	committed	Aug. 1995	-
Botswana	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Brazil	1	2	committed/lacking	1994/1995	-
Bulgaria	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Canada	6	18	committed	1994	yes
Cen. Afr. Republic	1	-	committed	1994	-
Chile	0	1	committed	-	-
China	3	0	committed	Sept. 1995	yes
Colombia	1	0	committed	1995	yes
Cook Islands	0	1	committed	1994	-
Costa Rica	0	1	committed	-	-
Czech Republic	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Denmark	1	0	lacking	unknown	yes
Egypt	1	0	lacking	unknown	-
Ethiopia	0	1	committed	March 1995	-
Finland	1	2	committed	1994	yes
France	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Germany	1	9	committed	1994	yes
Hungary	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Iceland	0	1	committed	-	-
India	1	0	committed	unknown	-
Indonesia	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Iran	1	1	committed	1995	yes
Israel	0	1	committed	July 1995	yes
Italy	0	2	committed	1994	yes
Ivory Coast	1	-	committed	June 1995	-
Japan	1	7	committed	1994/Sept. 1995	yes
Kazakhstan	1	-	committed	unknown	-
Kenya	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Rep. of Korea	1	-	lacking	unknown	-
Mexico	1	2	lacking	unknown	-
Mongolia	1	1	committed	1995	-
Netherlands	0	1	committed	1994	yes
New Zealand	0	1	committed	1994	yes
Norway	3	1	committed	1994/1995	yes
Pakistan	1	1	committed	1995	-
Papua New Guinea	1	-	committed[1]	Jan. 1995	-

1. Envisaged Alpha station currently used as Beta station

Country	Alpha Stations Envisaged by GSE	Beta Stations Offered	Station Commitment Status	Data Available to IDC	Gamma Data Committed
Paraguay	1	-	committed	1994	-
Peru	0	1	committed	1995	yes
Philippines	0	1	committed	-	-
Poland	0	1	lacking	unknown	yes
Portugal	0	1	committed	-	-
Romania	0	1	committed	1996	yes
Russian Federation	5	5	committed	1994/1995	yes
Seychelles	0	1	committed	-	-
Solomon Islands	0	1	committed	March 1995	-
South Africa	1	1	committed	1994/1995	yes
Spain	1	2	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Sweden	1	0	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Switzerland	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	yes
Thailand	1	-	committed	Feb. 1995	-
Tunisia	1	-	lacking	Late 1995	-
Turkey	1	-	committed	unknown	-
Turkmenistan	1	-	committed	Aug. 1995	-
Ukraine	0	1	committed	1995	-
United Kingdom	0	3	committed	1994/1995	yes
United States	7	12	committed	1994/1995	yes
Venezuela	0	1	committed	1995	-
Western Samoa	0	1	committed	1994	-
Zambia	0	1	committed	Jan. 1995	-
TOTAL (Committed)	60(50)	106 (99)	53 countries		30

Table 2: GSETT-3 Stations

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Argentina						
Paso Flores	PLCA	α	3-C	-40.731	-70.550	yes
Coronel Fontana	CFA	β	3-C	-31.607	-68.239	no
Australia						
Alice Springs	ASAR	α	array	-23.666	133.904	yes
Mawson, Antarctica	MAW	α	3-C	-67.604	62.871	yes
Stephens Creek	STKA	α	3-C	-31.882	141.592	yes
Warramunga	WRA	α	array	-19.943	134.339	yes
Woolibar	WOOL	α	3-C	-31.073	121.678	yes
Armidale	ARMA	β	3-C	-30.420	151.628	yes
Casey	CSY	β	1-C	-66.289	110.529	yes
Charters Towers	CTA	β	3-C	-20.088	146.254	yes
Fitzroy Crossing	FITZ	β	3-C	-18.103	125.643	yes
Forrest	FORT	β	1-C	-30.779	128.059	yes
Meekatharra	MEEK	β	1-C	-26.614	118.536	yes
Mount Isa	QIS	β	1-C	-20.558	139.605	yes
Narrogin	NWAO	β	3-C	-32.927	117.233	yes
Roma	RMQ	β	1-C	-26.489	148.755	yes
Toolangi	TOO	β	3-C	-37.571	145.491	yes
Warburtan	WARB	β	3-C	-26.184	126.643	yes
Young	YOU	β	1-C	-34.278	148.382	yes
Austria						
Molln	MOA	β	3-C	47.850	14.266	no
Bolivia						
La Paz	LPAZ	α	3-C	-16.288	-68.131	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Botswana						
Lobatse	LBTB	α	3-C	-25.015	25.597	no
Brazil						
Brasilia	BDFB	α	3-C	-15.642	-48.015	yes
Pitinga	PTGA	β	3-C	-3.060	-60.000	no
Rio Grande do Norte	RGNB	β	3-C	-6.910	-36.950	no
Bulgaria						
Vitosha	VTS	β	3-C	42.618	23.238	no
Canada						
Lac du Bonnet	ULM	α	3-C	50.250	-95.875	yes
Mould Bay	MBC	α	3-C	76.242	-119.360	yes
Schefferville	SCHQ	α	3-C	54.817	-66.783	yes
Waterton Lakes	WALA	α	3-C	49.059	-113.912	yes
Whitehorse	WHY	α	3-C	60.660	-134.881	yes
Yellowknife	YKA	α	array	62.493	-114.605	yes
Bella Bella	BBB	β	3-C	52.185	-128.113	yes
Caledonia Mtn.	LMN	β	3-C	45.852	-64.806	yes
Dawson City	DAWY	β	3-C	64.066	-139.391	yes
Dease Lake	DLBC	β	3-C	58.417	-130.060	yes
Deer Lake	DRLN	β	3-C	49.256	-57.504	yes
Edmonton	EDM	β	3-C	53.222	-113.350	yes
Eldee	EEO	β	1-C	46.641	-79.073	yes
Fort Churchill	FCC	β	3-C	58.761	-94.087	yes
Glen Almond	GAC	β	3-C	45.703	-75.478	yes
Inuvik	INK	β	3-C	68.307	-133.520	yes
Iqaluit	FRB	β	3-C	63.747	-68.547	yes
La Malbaie	LMQ	β	3-C	47.548	-70.327	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Pac. Geoscience	PGC	β	3-C	48.650	-123.451	yes
Pemberton	PMB	β	3-C	50.520	-123.073	yes
Penticton	PNT	β	3-C	49.317	-119.617	yes
Resolute Bay	RES	β	3-C	74.687	-94.900	yes
Sadowa	SADO	β	3-C	44.769	-79.142	yes
Thunder Bay	TBO	β	1-C	48.647	-89.408	yes
Central African Republic						
Bangui	BGCA	α	3-C	5.176	18.424	yes
Chile						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
China						
Beijing	BJT	α	3-C	40.040	116.180	no
Hailar	HIA	α	3-C	49.267	119.742	no
Lanzhou	LZH	α	3-C	36.087	103.844	no
Colombia						
To be defined	XSA	α	3-C			no
Cook Islands						
Rarotonga	RAR	β	3-C	-21.213	-159.773	yes
Costa Rica						
Las Juntas de Abangares	JTS	β	3-C	10.290	-87.950	no
Czech Republic						
Vranov	VRAC	β	3-C	49.311	16.596	yes
Denmark						
Danmarkshavn	DAG	α	3-C	76.770	-18.650	no
Egypt						
LUXESS	LXAR	α	array	26.000	33.000	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Ethiopia						
Addis Ababa	AAE	β	3-C	9.029	38.766	yes
Finland						
FINESS	FINES	α	array	61.444	26.077	yes
Kangasniemi	KAF	β	3-C	62.113	26.306	yes
Ylistaro	VAF	β	3-C	63.042	22.672	yes
France						
Lormes	LOR	α	3-C	47.268	3.859	yes
Germany						
GERESS	GERES	α	array	48.845	13.702	yes
Berggiesshübel	BRG	β	3-C	50.875	13.947	yes
Black Forest	BFO	β	3-C	48.331	8.330	yes
Bochum	BUG	β	3-C	51.446	7.264	yes
Clausthal-Zellerfeld	CLZ	β	3-C	51.843	10.374	yes
Collm	CLL	β	3-C	51.310	13.000	yes
Fürstenfeldbruck	FUR	β	3-C	48.164	11.277	yes
Gräfenberg	GRFO	β	3-C	49.692	11.205	yes
Moxa	MOX	β	3-C	50.646	11.616	yes
Taunus	TNS	β	3-C	50.224	8.449	yes
Hungary						
Piszkes	PSZ	β	3-C	47.918	19.895	yes
Iceland						
Borgarnes	BORG	β	3-C	64.500	-21.500	no
India						
Gauribidanur	GBA	α	array	13.604	77.436	no
Indonesia						

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
To be defined	XIN	α	3-C			no
Iran						
Teluran	THR	α	3-C	35.818	51.393	no
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Israel						
Bar Giyora	BGIO	β	3-C	31.722	35.092	yes
Italy						
L'Aquila	AQU	β	3-C	42.354	13.405	yes
Villasalto	VSL	β	3-C	39.496	9.378	yes
Ivory Coast						
Dimborko	DBIC	α	3-C	6.670	-4.856	yes
Japan						
Matsushiro	MJAR	α	array	36.543	138.207	yes
Aobayama	AOB	β	3-C	38.250	140.850	no
Chichijima	OGS	β	3-C	27.060	142.200	no
Hachijojima	HCH	β	3-C	33.120	139.800	no
Ishigakijima	ISG	β	3-C	24.380	124.230	no
Kaminokuni	KKJ	β	3-C	41.780	140.180	no
Shiraki	SHK	β	3-C	34.530	132.680	no
Tsukuba	TSK	β	3-C	36.210	140.110	no
Kazakhstan						
Aktubinsk	AKT0	α	array	50.434	58.018	no
Kenya						
Nairobi	KMBO	α	3-C	-1.274	36.804	no
Korea, Republic of						
To be defined	XKO0	α	array	37.000	128.000	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Mexico						
To be defined	XMEX	α	3-C	18.000	-96.000	no
Chilapa	CHAM	β	3-C	17.000	-99.000	no
Iguala	IGUM	β	3-C	19.000	-100.000	no
Mongolia						
To be defined	XMON	α	3-C			no
Ulaan-Baatar	ULN	β	3-C	47.520	107.030	yes
Netherlands						
Heimansgroave	HGN	β	3-C	50.764	5.932	yes
New Zealand						
South Karori	SNZ0	β	3-C	-41.310	174.705	yes
Norway						
ARCESS	ARCES	α	array	69.535	25.506	yes
NORSAR	NAO	α	array	60.824	10.832	no
Spitsbergen	SPITS	α	array	78.178	16.370	yes
NORESS	NORES	β	array	60.735	11.541	yes, as α station
Pakistan						
Pari	PKAR	α	array	33.050	73.252	no
Nilore	NIL	β	3-C	33.600	73.100	no
Papua New Guinea						
Port Moresby	PMG	α	3-C	-9.409	147.154	yes, as β station
Paraguay						
Villa Florida	CPUP	α	3-C	-26.331	-57.329	yes
Peru						
Nana	NNA	β	3-C	-11.990	-76.840	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Philippines						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Poland						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Portugal						
To be defined		β	3-C			no
Romania						
Muntele Rosu	MLR	β	3-C	45.492	25.944	no
Russian Federation						
Khabaz	KBZ	α	3-C	43.729	42.898	no
Norilsk	NRI	α	3-C	69.400	88.100	no
Peleduy	PDY	α	3-C	59.633	112.700	yes
Ussuriisk	USK	α	3-C	44.283	132.083	no
Zalesovo	ZAL	α	3-C	53.940	84.805	no
Arti	ARU	β	3-C	56.430	58.563	yes
Kislovodsk	KIV0	β	array	43.956	42.695	yes
Obninsk	OBN	β	3-C	55.117	36.600	yes
Urgal	URG	β	3-C	51.099	132.364	no
Zilim	UFA	β	3-C	53.850	57.050	no
Seychelles						
Mahe	MSEY	β	3-C	-4.610	55.490	no
Solomon Islands						
Honiara	HNR	β	3-C	-9.432	159.947	yes
South Africa						
Boshof	BOSA	α	3-C	-28.614	25.556	yes
Silverton	SLR	β	3-C	-25.740	28.280	no

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
Spain						
Sonseca	ESDC	α	array	39.677	-3.962	yes
San Pablo de los Montes	PAB	β	3-C	39.546	-4.348	yes
Taburiente	TBT	β	3-C	28.679	-17.913	yes
Sweden						
Hagfors	HFS	α	array	60.134	13.697	yes
Switzerland						
Alpnach	APL	β	3-C	46.950	8.243	yes
Thailand						
Chiang Mai	CMAR	α	array	18.458	98.943	yes
Tunisia						
Thala	THA	α	3-C	35.560	8.700	no
Turkey						
To be defined	XTUR	α	array	39.000	34.000	no
Turkmenistan						
Alibek	ABKT	α	3-C	37.930	58.119	yes
Ukraine						
Kiev	KIEV	β	3-C	50.694	29.208	yes
United Kingdom						
Eskdalemuir	EKA	β	array	55.333	-3.159	yes
Wolverton	WOL	β	3-C	51.313	-1.223	no
Ascension Island	ASCN	β	3-C	-7.950	-14.380	no
United States						
Lajitas	TXAR	α	array	29.334	-103.667	yes
Lisbon	LBNH	α	3-C	44.240	-71.926	yes
Mount Ida	MIAR	α	3-C	34.546	-93.573	yes

Station Name (in alphabetical order by country and type)	Code	Type	Station Type	Latitude	Longitude	Data used by IDC as of 18 August 1995
North Pole	NPO	α	3-C	64.771	-146.887	yes
Pinedale	PDAR	α	array	42.767	-109.558	yes
Pinon Flats	PFO	α	3-C	33.609	-116.455	yes
Vanda, Antarctica	VNDA	α	3-C	-77.514	161.846	yes
Albuquerque	ALQ	β	3-C	34.946	-106.457	yes
Black Hills	RSSD	β	3-C	44.120	-104.036	yes
Blacksburg	BLA	β	3-C	37.211	-80.421	yes
Dugway	DUG	β	3-C	40.195	-112.816	yes
Elko	ELK	β	3-C	40.745	-115.239	yes
Ely	EYMN	β	3-C	47.947	-91.508	yes
Kanab	KNB	β	3-C	37.020	-112.820	no
Mina	MNV	β	3-C	38.433	-118.153	yes
Newport	NEW	β	3-C	48.263	-117.120	yes
Tucson	TUC	β	3-C	32.310	-110.785	yes
Tuckaleechee Caverns	TKL	β	3-C	35.658	-83.774	yes
Tulsa	TUL	β	3-C	35.911	-95.793	yes
Venezuela						
Santo Domingo	SDV	β	3-C	8.879	-70.633	yes
Western Samoa						
Afiamalu	AFI	β	3-C	-13.909	-171.779	yes
Zambia						
Lusaka	LSZ	β	3-C	-15.277	28.188	yes



Fig. 1. Alpha stations used by the IDC as of 18 August 1995. Arrays are shown as filled circles and three-component stations as filled triangles.



Fig. 2. Beta stations used by the IDC as of 18 August 1995. Arrays are shown as filled circles and three- and one-component stations as filled triangles.

Annex 3

Draft work programme for the next (42nd) session

1. Review of initial draft of a GSETT-3 evaluation report

2. Review of initial list of recommended auxiliary stations
3. Review of initial draft plan for the GSETT-3 to IMS transition

4. Discussion of future plans

5. Answer possible questions relating to GSETT-3 from the NTB Ad Hoc Committee or its Working Group on Verification

6. Submission of a progress report to the CD

7. Other matters

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1342
24 August 1995

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CHILE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHILE ON 19 AUGUST 1995 CONDEMNING THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION CONDUCTED RECENTLY BY CHINA

The Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva presents its compliments to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the official communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile on 19 August condemning the nuclear explosion conducted recently by the People's Republic of China.

The Permanent Mission of Chile requests the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament to arrange for this communiqué to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.95-63523 (E)

Official communiqué

The Government of Chile expresses its forceful condemnation of the further detonation of a nuclear device carried out by the People's Republic of China on 16 August at the Lop Nor test site on the Chinese mainland.

This explosion, the second to be carried out by China in the past three months, stands in clear contradiction to the principles and objectives for non-proliferation agreed upon by the international community, the People's Republic of China included, during the Conference on the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty held last May. During the Conference, the nuclear Powers agreed to exercise utmost restraint with regard to this type of test pending the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT).

This explosion also contrasts with the recent positive announcements made by the nuclear Powers regarding acceptance of the proposal to ban all types of nuclear experiments or explosions without reservations (the zero option), in the context of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which it is hoped to conclude in 1996. Hence the timing could not be more unfortunate, when the entire world is displaying special awareness of these tests and a progressive and firm resolve to move forward in all areas of nuclear disarmament with the aim of achieving a total ban on nuclear weapons as soon as possible, as the best guarantee of international peace and security.

Consequently, the Government of Chile, which strongly opposed the nuclear tests announced by France in the South Pacific, considers that the explosions recorded in the People's Republic of China, even though they took place in a region far distant from Chile's geopolitical interests, should be completely rejected.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1343
28 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE CONFERENCE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY OF THE WHITE HOUSE ON 17 AUGUST 1995 CONCERNING THE NUCLEAR TEST CONDUCTED BY CHINA ON THAT DAY

Attached is a copy of a Statement by the Press Secretary of the White House made on 17 August 1995, concerning the nuclear test conducted by China on that day.

I would be grateful if you would issue this document as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY, 17 AUGUST 1995

Today China conducted an underground nuclear test at the Lop Nur test site in north-west China. The United States deeply regrets this action. All of the Nuclear Weapon States agreed at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NTP) Review and Extension Conference in New York in May 1995 to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We urge China to refrain from further nuclear tests and join in a global moratorium as we work to complete a CTBT in 1996. We further urge China to endorse President Clinton's recent call for a true "zero yield" CTBT.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1344
28 August 1995

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PHILIPPINES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, HIS EXCELLENCY FIDEL V. RAMOS, CONCERNING THE RECENT CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST

I have the honour to communicate to you the attached statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Philippines, concerning the recent Chinese nuclear test.

I would be grateful if the above-mentioned statement could be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): LILIA R. BAUTISTA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF H.E. PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS OF THE PHILIPPINES
ON CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST
18 August 1995

The Philippines strongly deplores the test of a nuclear device which China conducted yesterday.

The test was the second that China had conducted since the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in April this year. It manifestly violated the understanding that had prevailed at the NPT Review Conference that all nuclear-weapons States would exercise utmost restraint with respect to nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996.

China's decision to continue testing flies in the face of the statement by the ASEAN regional forum earlier this month, which called on nuclear-weapons States to bring an immediate end to nuclear testing.

The Philippines urges China, as well as France, to abandon plans for further nuclear tests, which have raised serious concerns about the sincerity of the nuclear-weapons States, and deter disarmament initiatives, including the conclusion of a test-ban treaty.

The Philippines has consistently taken an active stand on issues relating to nuclear testing. Following China's previous test and the announcement by France of its plans to resume tests in the South Pacific, we have in our capacity as Chairman of the Group of 77, initiated resolutions in multilateral fora, including the United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency, calling for an end to nuclear tests and for strict adherence to understandings reached in the Review Conference. We have also taken an active role in pushing for the establishment of a South-East Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone.